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Abstract: 
Sociological research on the European Union provides a much needed alternative to mainstream 
EU-studies  dominated  by  economics,  law,  IR  and  political  science.  However,  until  now  this 
sociological  alternative  has  mostly  involved  the  adaptation  of  sociological  terminology  such  as 
“social construction” or “identity” and the introduction of new objects of research, such as the 
social  conventions  regulating  national  security  or  the  discursive  constructions  of  Europe.  It  is 
however  the  claim  of  this  paper  that  sociological  theory  also  provides  the  tools  for  a  more 
fundamental re-evaluation of some of the ontological and epistemological presuppositions of EU 
research and a corresponding reconstruction of the object of study of European studies. 
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Résumé : 
La recherche sociologique sur l’Union Européenne constitue une alternative bienvenue aux études 
européennes  dominées  par  l’économie,  le  droit,  les  relations  internationales  et  les  sciences 
politiques. Pourtant, jusqu’ici, cette alternative sociologique a généralement consisté à adapter une 
terminologie  sociologique  de  « construction  sociale »  ou  « identité »  à  de  nouveaux  objets  de 
recherche tels que les conventions sociales qui font la régulation de la sécurité nationale ou les 
constructions discursives de l’Europe. Cet article se propose de montrer que la théorie sociologique 
fournit aussi des outils pour une révision plus fondamentale de certains des a priori ontologiques et 
épistémologiques  de  la  recherche  sur  l’Union  Européenne  et  une  reconstruction  à  l’avenant  de 
l’objet d’étude des études européennes. 
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Introduction 
 
Sociological research on the European Union 
provides  a  much-needed  alternative  to 
mainstream  EU-studies  dominated  by 
economics,  law,  IR  and  political  science. 
However,  until  now  this  sociological 
alternative has mostly involved the adaptation 
of  sociological  terminology  such  as  “social 
construction”  or  “identity”  and  the 
introduction of new objects of research, such 
as the social conventions regulating national 
security  or  the  discursive  constructions  of 
Europe  (see  for  example  Katzenstein  1996, 
Christiansen,  Jorgensen,  and  Wiener  2001). 
These  works  have  undoubtedly  helped 
produce  a  more  complex  and  sophisticated 
picture  of  the  EU  as  a  layered,  polycentric 
political  figuration  and  contributed  to 
significant advances in European studies (for 
recent presentations see for example Kohler-
Koch  and  Rittberger  2006,  Quaglia,  De 
Fransesco and Radaelli 2008). It is however 
the claim of this paper that sociological theory 
also  provides  the  tools  for  a  more 
fundamental  re-evaluation  of  some  of  the 
ontological  and  epistemological 
presuppositions  of  EU  research  and  a 
corresponding reconstruction of the object of 
study of European studies. In the following, I 
will further develop a sociological framework 
by exploring key notions such as rationality 
and reflexivity. It is my claim that these are 
the  tools  necessary  for  explaining  what 
remains one of the biggest issues of European 
studies,  namely  the  interplay  of  European 
institutions  and  agents  both  within  the 
Brussels game and across national frontiers.  
  In  distinction  to  other  recent 
sociological approaches to European regional 
integration  such  as  systems  analysis 
(Stichweh  2004,  Albert  2005),  world  polity 
theory  (Beckfield  2006),  frame  analysis 
(Medrano  2003)  or  strategic  action  analysis 
(Schimmelfennig  2002,  2003),  the  structural 
constructivist  approach  developed  in  this 
paper emphasises both the macro-level links 
between major social institutions and power 
and the micro-level actions of individuals and 
groups  in  more  or  less  structured  social 
spheres.  In  distinction  to  more  structural 
approaches, institutions, practices and agents 
do not necessarily form enclosed, autonomous 
fields  in  the  bourdieusian  sense  or 
organisational  fields  in  the  sense  of 
neoinstitutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991). Rather, constrained by webs of social 
and  institutional  relationships,  they  evolve 
unevenly.  In  political  science,  this  research 
perspective contributes to a more developed 
sociological institutionalism that concentrates 
on the interaction of agents and institutions, a 
dimension  that  has  been  neglected  in 
institutionalist  research  on  political 
institutions  (Peters  1999,  70).  Recent 
empirical  studies  that  focus  from  a  similar 
research  perspective  on  the  interaction 
between individuals and institutions in the EU 
include works on Members of the European 
Parliament  (Beauvallet  2007),  on  European 
civil  servants  (Georgakakis  and  de  Lassalle 
2007), on regional elites (Kull 2008), and on 
lawyers (Cohen and Vauchez 2007, Madsen 
2006, forthcoming).    
The  background  for  attempting  these 
significant  sociological  reorientations  in  the 
study  of  the  European  construction  is 
informed by a number of empirical studies I 
have conducted in recent years on European 
political  institutions.  Generally,  these  works 
argue  that  the  logic  of  change  of  essential 
European  institutions  like  the  European  
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Commission and the European Parliament is 
not only due to internal dynamics but is also 
linked  to  transnational  interplays  of 
differentiated agents operating simultaneously 
in multiple social spheres (Kauppi 2005). My 
studies  suggest  that  institutions  and 
particularly  institutional  change  have  to  be 
explained  in  the  light  of  both  new  policy 
challenges and the individual preferences and 
habits  of  the  agents  making  up  these 
institutions  and  their  surroundings. 
Consequently, such an analysis challenges a 
number  of  firmly  held  epistemological  and 
ontological  assumptions  of  mainstream 
European  research  (cf.  for  instance  Checkel 
2005,  for  an  overview  Kohler-Koch  and 
Rittberger  2006,  27-49,  Trondal  2007). 
Moreover,  it  defies  the  common  view  of 
rationality as exogenous. In this account, not 
all  actors  or  agents  are  equally  rational  or 
irrational, but play different social roles and 
rely on differentiated knowledge. Ultimately, 
it is my claim that examining these interplays 
allows for a more accurate understanding of 
both agents and institutions in the EU.  
Building on previous work, I will first, 
in  contrast  to  an  exogenous  conception  of 
rationality, develop a more complex version 
of  rationality  that  fuses  (neo)realist  and 
constructivist  elements  in  terms  of  social 
action in specific figurations. This is followed 
by a brief analysis of political institutions as 
layered  and  embodied  structures  of  social 
action that are not just objectified and external 
to  individuals  as  in  most  EU  research  but 
rather both objective and subjective. In a third 
section,  contra  the  philosophical  theory  of 
reflexivity developed by Habermas, I present 
some  elements  for  a  sociological  version  of 
reflexivity  as  a  key  component  of  social 
competence,  power  and  learning.  These 
sections  concretely  suggest  a  number  of 
research strategies and a reconstruction of the 
object of study, which aims at fusing research 
on  the  EU  with  the  insights  developed  on 
bounded  rationality,  embodied  institutions, 
and power and reflexivity. 
 
 
 
Bounded rationality 
 
In  his  “synthetic  institutionalist  approach”, 
Frank Schimmelfennig (2003) seeks to bridge 
the  gap  between  a  rationalist  and  a 
constructivist  account  of  preferences. 
Following  rationalist  institutionalism,  he 
argues that agents in the EU act “strategically 
on  the  basis  of  exogenous  specific  policy 
preferences”,  but  they  do  so  within  a 
community environment defined by its ethos 
and  a  high  interaction  density.  However, 
“institutions  constrain  the  choices  and 
behavior of self-interested actors but do not 
constitute  their  identity  and  interests” 
(Schimmelfennig  2003,  161).  Basing  this 
novel approach on the sociological works of 
Erving  Goffmann  (see  also  Schimmelfennig 
2002),  Schimmelfennig  argues  for  a 
sequencing  of  rationalist  and  constructivist 
propositions  in  an  analysis  of  EU  policy 
issues.  
In his empirical analysis of the eastern 
enlargement  of  the  EU,  Schimmelfennig 
combines  a  “rationalist”  account  of 
preferences  and  logics  of  action  that  is 
followed  by  a  constructivist  explanation  of 
interaction  dynamics  and  outcome.  In  other 
words, the enlargement preferences of the EU 
member  States  can  be  explained  by  the 
preferences  of  these  and  not  by  the 
community  ethos  of  the  EU  that,  however, 
prevents  those  reticent  to  enlargement  from 
sabotaging the process. In Schimmelfennig’s 
analysis,  the  enlargement  preferences  of  the 
EU  member  States  and  not  the  social 
conventions  regulating  social  interaction  in 
the  community  environment,  which  do  not 
affect  preferences,  determined  the  larger 
process  of  enlargement.  Schimmelfennig’s 
approach  might  thus  be  described  as  a 
rationalist  one  topped  with  a  thin  layer  of 
constructivism, and wrapped up in a second 
thick layer of rationalism. 
While Schimmelfennig is sensitive to 
sociological  argumentation  and  even 
considers that his approach represents a form 
of institutionalism, his analysis, in great part 
because  of  his  initial  epistemological  and 
ontological  presuppositions,  reinforces  a  
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dualistic conception of social reality, in which 
individual  preference  formation  is 
independent  of  the  social  sphere  in  which 
these  agents  operate  (for  a  similar 
epistemological  and  ontological  position  see 
Wendt 1999). This dualism prevents a deeper 
analysis of the interaction between agents and 
the  EU  environment,  of  social  roles,  of 
political  institutions,  and  of  the  complicity 
between the individual and his/her habitat in 
terms  of  knowledge  and  action.  The  mutual 
constitution of society and individual dear to 
so many sociologists (Berger and Luckmann 
1966, Elias 1983) is transformed into a rather 
basic schema according to which, in the end, 
individuals create institutions but institutions 
have little effect on individuals.  
An  alternative  sociological  approach, 
inspired by works in social theory (Berger and 
Luckmann  1966)  and  social  movement 
research (see for instance Tarrow 1997), tries 
to solve the dualism between rationalism and 
constructivism  in  EU-studies  in  a  different 
way.  Following  Schimmelfennig,  this 
approach  combines  these  two  elements, 
rationalism  and  constructivism,  but  not 
sequentially.  Instead  of  arguing,  like 
Schimmelfenning  and  a  great  majority  of 
rationalist institutionalists do, that preference 
formation is exogenous to social and political 
institutions,  or  of  maintaining  the  opposite 
extreme  constructivist  stance  according  to 
which  the  logic  of  social  action  is  always 
endogenously  formed  (cf.  for  instance 
Douglas 1986), this approach argues that the 
formal  aim  or  logic  of  social  action  is  the 
same  in  all  social  spheres  and  is  therefore 
exogenous  to  institutions,  but  that  the 
substantive  logic  of  social  action  is 
endogenous to institutions. The formal logic 
consists,  for  social  agents,  of  acquiring  the 
resources  that  are,  in  their  eyes,  the  most 
valued.  These  can  be  political  power  for 
politicians,  financial  profits  for  businessmen 
or intellectual recognition for academics, for 
instance. These agents are all then engaged in 
a semi-controlled competition for values that 
are  prized  in  their  spheres  of  social  action 
(Weber  1968,  Waltzer  1983),  values  that 
motivate their action and gives it meaning.  
But this formal and teleological logic 
of accumulation does not explain what kinds 
of actions and values these agents engage in 
or  even  what  are  the  goals  of  their  actions. 
The formal level of analysis (see Meyer et al. 
1997, Beckfield 2006) has to be linked to the 
actual  practices  of  the  agents  involved.  The 
substantive logic of their actions, the type of 
actions they engage in, where and when, with 
whom,  is  dependent  on  the  chronotopic 
(Bakhtin  1981)  or  figurational  (Elias  1983), 
that  is,  the  temporal  and  structural 
characteristics  of  the  spheres  in  which  they 
operate.  Their  preferences  are  endogenously 
formed  in  the  sense  that  what  they  aim  at 
depends  on  various  historical  and  structural 
factors  that  structure  their  sphere  of  social 
action.  Social  and  cultural  conventions  and 
norms exist in terms not only of the means 
through  which  certain  resources  can  be 
acquired,  but  also  in  terms  of  exactly  what 
will the most valued resource that most in a 
sphere of social action will struggle to attain 
at  a  specific  point  in  time  and  space.  In  a 
nutshell,  in  this  alternative  sociological 
approach the formal logic of social action is 
exogenous but the substantive logic of social 
action is endogenous.  
An  additional  problem  is  that  some 
constructivists  theoretically  separate  interest 
from  value,  the  strategic  calculation  of  the 
agents  from  socialization,  which  would  not 
involve  calculation.  In  reality,  however, 
individuals  have  an  interest  in  some  value 
more than in others. For instance, academics 
might  systematically  pursue  symbolic 
recognition  by  peers  instead  of  monetary 
awards.  Individuals  socialized  in  certain 
actions  and  preferences  like  engaging  in 
scholarly  activities  calculate  (“It  might  be 
better  to  publish  here”)  and  intuitively  play 
out  their  role,  without  even  separating 
socialization  from  calculation.  A  competent 
social agent switches from one to the other. 
The  “end  point”  of  socialization  is  not 
internalization,  as  Checkel  argues  (Checkel 
2005, 806) but rather the sociologically more 
interesting externalization that is social action 
in  the  world  (Berger  and  Luckmann  1966). 
Social  action  is  both  endogenous  and  
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exogenous, involving bounded rationality and 
calculation of costs and benefits. 
In order to be specific about what the 
goals  of  different  agents  are,  what  will  be 
crucial will be the delimitation of the sphere 
of social action in which individuals operate, 
of exactly what kind of social, joint action we 
are talking about. This delimitation is crucial 
because,  to  a  certain  extent,  this  will 
determine the limits of the playing field. To 
evaluate  this,  equating  like  Schimmelfennig 
does  “the  community  environment“  with 
“social  structure”  is  too  vague.  We  need  to 
specify  what  are  the  collective  ends  of  the 
actions  in  question  and  what  kinds  of 
institutional  figurations,  as  complex  layered 
structures  of  joint  actions  (Searle  1983) 
mould  these  actions.  If  we  talk  about 
European  energy  policy,  we  will  have 
national  governments,  European  institutions, 
private and public agents and so on. Certain 
technological  constraints  will  frame  the 
actions of these individuals. All these agents 
will  be  involved  in  a  political  struggle  the 
goal of which is the determination of the EU’s 
energy policy. The controlled competition in 
this  policy  sphere  will  be  regulated  and 
constituted by various social conventions and 
norms of various strength. These institutions 
and  the  social  roles  that  are  constitutive  of 
these institutions have specific characteristics 
that mainstream approaches, because of their 
emphasis  on  institutions  as  objectified 
entities, tend to minimize.  
The  advantage  of  such  a  more 
complex  theoretical  understanding  of 
rationality  is  that  it  enables  us  to  see  the 
similarities  between  rationality  and  social 
action in different social spheres while at the 
same  time  being  sensitive  to  their  historical 
and structural variations. This central critique 
can  be  illustrated  by  a  return  to  one  of  the 
most cherished objects of EU-studies, namely 
institutions. In the following section, I further 
elaborate  this  argument  by  looking  into  the 
interplay of agents and institutions.  
 
 
 
 
Embodied institutions 
 
Most  of  political  reality  is  symbolic, 
immaterial and virtual, but it requires physical 
supports,  individuals,  social  actions, 
stationery,  buildings,  and  the  like  to  really 
exist. Even in one of the most sophisticated 
sociological theories of European integration, 
Schimmelfennig’s  synthetic  institutionalist 
approach,  political  institutions  are 
systematically presented in an objectified and 
disembodied  form.  Institutions  are  not  only 
exterior to individual agents, but they also are 
quasi-material  in  terms  of  modes  of  social 
existence.  Further,  they  are  reified  and 
anthropomorphized, presented as having wills 
of  their  own.  They  are  the  central  dramatis 
personae  of  European  integration  and 
European politics. In this political ontology of 
European integration, agents are States or the 
Commission  for  instance  (cf.  for  instance 
Moravcsik  1999).  This  projection  from  the 
individual  to  the  institution  is  a  major 
problem  in  Schimmelfennig’s  adaptation  of 
Goffman’s sociological framework, in which 
agents are individuals, not institutions. In fact, 
an analogous process took place in Wendt’s 
social  constructivist  analysis  of  IR  (Wendt 
1999),  where  Wendt  projected  individual-
level analysis and presuppositions based on a 
reading  of  Erving  Goffman  and  George 
Herbert  Mead  onto  to  a  “higher”  plane  to 
analyze social and political institutions.  
The  same  habit  of  mixing  the 
individual agent and States or institutions is 
visible  in  more  recent  constructivist  works 
(for  instance  Checkel  2005).  But  in  this 
operation,  institutions  are  transformed  into 
objectified entities that have a rational mind 
of their own following an asocial “economist” 
interpretation of the human mind. Curiously, 
in  Schimmelfennig’s  framework,  the 
preferences of the actors, the States, are “not 
informed by collective identities, norms and 
other ideas” (Schimmelfennig 2003, 161). An 
asocial  individual  finds  its  theoretical 
equivalent  in  an  asocial  institution. 
Institutions are examined without analysis of 
social  roles  and  the  social  characteristics  of 
those  occupying,  and  partly  making  them.  
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After all, institutions do not do anything by 
themselves.  
An alternative sociological framework 
makes  possible  a  more  complex  analysis  of 
preference formation and institutionalization. 
A first point has to be made about the social 
force  of  institutions.  Society,  or  any 
structured sphere of social action to be a bit 
more specific, is composed of institutions of 
varying  social  effect.  Some,  like  the  legal 
system,  are  strongly  codified  and  ritualized, 
with coercive social norms and social roles. In 
the  case  of  institutions  of  this  type, 
individuals  are  significantly  shaped  by 
institutional  conventions  and  norms.  Other 
institutions are weaker: their coercive force is 
lesser (see Olsen 2007 for analysis). But even 
then  exogenous  factors  are  not  necessarily 
exterior to the institutions. They might have 
to  do  with  the  individual  “baggage”  of 
occupiers of social roles in these institutions, 
a  “baggage”  that  is  tied  to  previous  social 
roles  in  other  institutional  spheres  (for  an 
empirical illustration see Erkkilä and Kauppi 
2008).  
In the case of strong institutions, those 
individuals  who  represent  the  institutions  in 
question will have to internalize institutional 
norms  in  order  to  be  competent 
representatives  of  the  institution.  A  “flow” 
has  to  develop  between  individual  and 
institution. The same “flow” (Czikenmikhaly 
2000) can be observed among prime ministers 
representing  their  country  in  the  EU,  for 
instance. When these individuals move from 
an  institutional  context  that  is  strongly 
codified like a national political sphere into a 
figuration  like  the  “EU  negotiating 
environment”  where  they  do  not  have  to 
abandon  their  social  role  but  are  in  fact 
encouraged  to  behave  according  to  it,  they 
will obviously do so. Their preferences will 
be  relatively  stable,  like  Schimmelfennig 
shows very well in his empirical study. But 
these  preferences  can  change  because  the 
individuals  representing  the  institution  in 
question  change  as  a  result  of  an  electoral 
defeat.  
For instance, the relationships between 
France and Germany have been mediated by 
the  relationships  between  their  respective 
leaders.  The  personal  relations  between 
Francois  Mitterrand  and  Helmut  Kohl  have 
significantly  shaped  not  only  the  relations 
between France and Germany but also the EU 
(Ross 1995). Consequently, the definition of 
national interest cannot be a fixed preference, 
as  Schimmelfennig  argues.  In  other  words 
certain  individuals  represent  the  State  and 
speak  in  its  name.  This  ventriloquism  is 
institutionalized and socially regulated. Only 
certain  individuals  have  access  to  this 
collective resource. It is difficult to see how a 
sociological  approach  that  does  not 
differentiate  between  institutions  and  those 
representing these institutions could possibly 
analyze  variations  in  policies  and,  thus, 
understand  the  social  forces  that  shape 
institutionalization,  the  temporal  and 
synchronic variations in political institutions. 
In  his  endeavour  to  keep  preferences  fixed 
and  exogenous,  Schimmelfennig  is  led  to 
formulate  questionable  statements,  such  as 
“these  preferences  [of  EU  actors]  are  not 
informed by collective identities, norms, and 
other ideas” (Schimmelfennig 2003, 161). If 
one  abandons  the  duality  individual-
institution,  one  does  not  need  to  separate 
interest from norm and social role. A similar 
kind  of  distinction  has  to  be  made  when 
analyzing  social  norms.  Social  norms  are 
institution-specific, and they vary depending 
on  social  positions  and  roles  in  institutional 
spheres. The effect of norms is never uniform, 
contrary  to  what  Schimmelfennig  seems  to 
assume. And if norms, such as those relative 
to  the  promotion  of  common  European 
values,  are  relatively  weak  in  a  specific 
institutional figuration, it does not mean they 
do not exist.  
Schimmelfennig makes a big case out 
of  his  finding  that  States  do  not  change 
preferences  when  deciding  about  EU 
enlargement. Preferences are thus fixed. Lets 
assume for discussion’s sake that institutions 
such as the “community environment” do not 
change  their  identity  and  interests.  But  this 
might have to do more with the characteristics 
of  the  “community  environment”  as 
conceptualized  by  Schimmelfennig.  Because  
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when we switch our focus to individual agents 
and their socialization, a distinction has to be 
made  between  socialization  tout  court  and 
professional  socialization.  For  instance,  to  a 
French  anti-European  MEP  (member  of  the 
European parliament) professional integration 
into the European Parliament is necessary, but 
it  might  not  involve  socialization  into 
European  values.  Competent  institutional 
behavior  does  not  necessarily  require 
ideological  commitment  on  the  part  of 
individuals  occupying  certain  social  roles 
(Beauvallet  2007).  In  fact,  what  can  be 
observed in institutions such as the European 
Parliament is an inversed Weberian process of 
socialization,  in  which  individuals  integrate 
the  institutions,  acquire  certain  professional 
skills  and  practices,  and  only  later  some  of 
them  commit  themselves  to  the  values  the 
institution is supposed to represent and defend 
(European values, European democracy, etc.). 
Preferences can thus be fixed and variable at 
the same time. Part of the problem has to do 
with  the  separation  of  national  and 
supranational  modes  of  behavior.  For 
instance, in his analysis of the Commission, 
Trondal  separates  from  one  another 
supranational and national social roles, as if 
they were mutually exclusive (Trondal 2007). 
It could be argued that all EU Member States 
are Europeanized and have developed a host 
of social and professional roles that are both 
supranational and national (for analysis at the 
regional level see for instance Kull 2008).  
The  possible  advantage  of  the 
alternative  sociological  approach  developed 
here is that it brings to the fore of the analysis 
institutions  as  embodied  entities  involving 
individual and collective social action. Yet to 
fully exhibit the heuristic advantages of such 
an  approach,  I  will  examine  a  further 
dimension central to European studies, power 
and reflexivity. 
 
 
Reflexivity and power 
 
A  key  dimension  absent  in  for  example 
Schimmelfennig’s  sociological  approach  is 
that  of  reflexivity.  This  dimension  has 
however  been  developed  by  other  EU-
scholars like Erik Eriksen. Basing himself on 
a Habermasian interpretation of reflexivity as 
democratic  deliberation,  Eriksen  defines 
reflexivity  in  terms  of  the  procedural  self-
reference and reflexivity of institutions and in 
terms  of  self-reflection  in  the  sense  of  the 
agents’  self-observation  and  operation  upon 
themselves  (Eriksen  2005).  This  version  of 
philosophical reflexivity considers social and 
political  action  in  a  vacuum,  involving 
rational,  universal  individuals  that  share  a 
code  of  behavior.  Reflexivity  is 
intellectualized,  detached  from  action  in  a 
specific  institutional  figuration  and  cultural 
setting. The link between reflexivity, conflict, 
power and action is undertheorized. What is 
more,  the  relationship  between  subject,  the 
individual observing or acting, and the object, 
the  object  of  study,  observation  or  of  an 
action, is almost completely absent. However, 
from a sociological point of view, it is clear 
that  the  relationship  between  subject  and 
object  is  not  constant  but  rather  interactive. 
Just  like  the  presence  of  the  anthropologist 
transforms  the  behaviour  of  the  objects  of 
study (see for instance Adam et al. 1990), it 
would  seem  logical  to  think  that 
transformations would also take place in the 
behaviour  of  the  subject  of  study,  the 
individual  conducting  the  research.  This 
dynamic between subject and object, central 
to  any  social  science  research,  should  be 
taken into account as an integral part of the 
research  process  and  help  avoid  the  natural 
scientific bias of social science research. 
The picture created by a sociological 
conception  of  reflexivity  is  considerably 
different  (cf.  Mills  1959,  Bourdieu  and 
Wacquant 1992). Individuals are embedded in 
social structures, and are engaged in actions 
in  the  world.  Reflexivity  is  not  just  an 
intellectual exercise but also social action and 
learning. But even more, it is also, especially 
in our modern, complex societies, a symbolic 
instrument  in  political  competition.  Those 
agents who have knowledge, who are capable 
of self-objectification, that is of an objective 
evaluation of their position and their realistic 
possibilities  in  a  certain  political  figuration,  
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are able to anticipate the actions of others and 
perhaps turn hopeless situations into, perhaps 
not  always  victories  but  at  least  acceptable 
outcomes  by  minimizing  the  damage. 
Reflexivity is a central  component of social 
competence and political power.  In order to 
survive,  individuals  have  to  interiorize  the 
formal and substantive logic of their spheres 
of social activity.  
When  discussing  the  issue  of 
reflexivity  in  the  context  of  the  EU  from  a 
sociological  point  of  view,  two  dimensions 
should  be  taken  into  consideration:  the 
reflexivity  of  the  agents  of  European 
integration,  individuals  and  groups  mostly, 
but  also  to  a  certain  extent  the  institutions 
involved in this process, and the reflexivity of 
the individuals observing this process, that is 
for  instance  analysts,  academics,  journalists, 
and  so  on.  The  latter  also  participate  in  the 
social  construction  of  the  European  Union. 
For instance, scientific knowledge is used by 
a  variety  of  political  agents  and  institutions 
such as the European Commission to mould 
their  policies  following  principles  of  social 
engineering.  This  is  very  clear  in  the 
Commission’s  new  communication  policy 
(see  Kauppi  2007  for  analysis).  Experts  in 
communication  were  needed  to  elaborate  a 
more  sophisticated  approach  to 
communication,  which  is  now  decoupled 
from institutional efficiency and coupled with 
democracy  and  participation.  The  line 
between  information  that  legitimizes  certain 
political  interests  and  information  that 
provides  a  critical  point  of  view  to  these 
policies is a very fine line indeed (cf. Kauppi 
and  Madsen  2007).  The  complicity  between 
scientific  observation  and  political 
engagement  is  nowhere  clearer  than  in  the 
double careers of a multitude of scholars and 
academics who have combined the scholarly 
study  of  the  EU  and  direct  political 
participation  in  the  construction  of  the  EU. 
Take Romano Prodi, a noted economist and 
Italian prime minister, becoming president of 
the European Commission. In this, and many 
other cases, scholarly merits are easily turned 
into  political  resources  that  can  be  used  to 
further  build  a  double  career,  scholarly  and 
political.  From  the  point  of  view  of  these 
agents,  political  and  intellectual  “vassalage” 
(Mulkay  1981) of social science to political 
decision makers is not seen as a danger to but 
rather as an opportunity for scholarly work.  
Developing  a  sociological  version  of 
reflexivity  requires  abandoning  the 
epistemological  and  ontological  standpoint 
according to which reality is “out there”, that 
it  constitutes  an  objectified,  nature-like, 
reality exterior to individuals and groups that 
is  strongly  objectified,  and  that  atomized 
individuals,  following  conventions  of 
deliberative  democracy,  would  somehow 
intuitively follow the same universal rules of 
conversation  and  rational  argumentation. 
Taking  a  somewhat  different  view,  we  can 
explore  the  symbolic  aspects  of  this  reality 
and of the socialized individuals and groups 
that  construct  it.  We  introduce  variation  at 
every  level  of  analysis,  that  of  individual 
perceptions of situations, of self-definitions of 
groups, of the political impact of norms and 
conventions,  of  the  stability  of  preferences 
and of the cohesion of institutional agents. If 
for  institutions  reflexivity  can  be 
conceptualized  in  terms  of  institutional 
adaptation,  collective  learning  and  so  on 
(Flockhart 2006, Olsen 2007), for individual 
politicians and social groups, reflexivity is a 
question  of  political  survival.  Reflexivity 
understood  as  sociological  reflexivity,  not 
philosophical  reflexivity,  thus  underscores  a 
crucial  aspect  of  EU-research:  the  power  of 
knowledge to create, not just reflect, political 
reality  through  social  action  and  political 
struggle.  A  sociological  conception  of 
reflexivity,  which  still  needs  to  be  further 
developed,  makes  possible  the  combined 
analysis  of  reflexivity  as  self-knowledge, 
learning and social power. It also sheds new 
light on European studies as an academic and 
professional practice. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The  epistemological  and  ontological 
presuppositions  and  the  dualisms  they 
produce  (individual-institution,  socialization- 
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calculation,  supranational-national,  etc.) 
outlined briefly here prevent a great deal of 
research  from  developing  a  more  complex, 
“thick”  description,  of  EU  integration.  If, 
from  the  outset,  individuals  would  be 
considered  social  beings,  they  would  never 
pursue  just  their  self-interest.  The  problem 
with the “as if” theorizing (Checkel 2005) of 
much  EU  research  is  that  in  practice 
institutions do not do anything by themselves. 
They do not act by themselves, they do not 
have  free  wills,  they  do  not  reason. 
Individuals  do  things  in  their  place  and  in 
their  name.  By  creating  a  parallel  world  in 
which institutions and States act like asocial, 
economically  rational  individuals  and  where 
socialized individuals are separated from the 
institutional spheres in which they act, these 
“as if” theorists evacuate from the realm of 
social inquiry a host of fundamental issues of 
social action and political power.  
It  seems  to  be  a  characteristic  of 
mainstream research on European integration 
to  project  presuppositions  concerning 
individual  human  beings  to  the  level  of 
political  institutions  such  as  Member  States 
and supranational institutions (see for recent 
examples  Eriksen  2005,  Bicchi  2006).  One 
consequence of this projection is the blurring 
of  the  lines  of  public  and  political 
responsibility. As institutions are not analyzed 
in relation with individuals and groups who at 
a  specific  point  in  time  have  the  right  or 
obligation  to  speak  in  the  name  of  the 
institutions  they  represent,  the  social  and 
politics  mechanisms  conditioning  public 
policies  are  left  untouched  and  even 
mystified.  In  terms  of  the  analysis  of 
institutions,  they  are  considered  as  being 
equally  institutionalized  or  non-
institutionalized,  thus  preventing  analysis  of 
level  of  institutionalization  of  European 
institutions, of the strength of the social roles 
they  inhabit,  of  institutions  as  embodied 
structures of social rules and norms, etc. Great 
deals  of  this  research  moreover  seem  to 
consider that all agents are equally reflexive, 
or  which  comes  to  the  same  non-reflexive. 
Agents  are  not  analyzed  in  terms  of 
differential  power  resources,  of  which 
reflexivity  (self-objectification  and  -
knowledge, learning, adaptation, etc.) would 
constitute one source. Finally, social science 
research  is  not  conceived  as  a  symbolic 
world-constructing  activity  that  involves 
subjects and objects that are in an interactive 
relationship,  but  as  a  merely  descriptive 
objectivising  exercise  that  reinforces  a 
functionalist, apolitical image of the European 
Union, a democracy without politics.  
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